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Why “they” never can be as good as “us”: 
How other organizations must be worse off on essential features 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Being different from competitors, in a positive sense, is an important asset to 
organizations. Well-chosen emphasis on distinctive organizational features is very helpful 
in achieving a superior position relative to rival organizations. However, organizations 
often claim to be distinctive on features where they appear be at best only moderately 
distinctive. Systematic bias seems to arise because what members see as distinctive about 
their organization is so closely interwoven with how they see its identity. In this study, 
organization members rated competitors systematically lower on a feature to the extent 
that they considered that feature to make up the essence of the identity of their own 
organization. The results point to a serious tendency to underestimate comparable 
competitors as a consequence of the social comparison heuristics. Managerially, this 
implies an important caution when designing corporate strategy and positioning. 
 2
Why “they” never can be as good as “us”: 
how other organizations must be worse off on essential features 
 
 
Being different from competitors, in a positive sense, is an important asset to nearly any 
organization. Organizations often engage in a differentiation strategy, seeking to be 
unique in their industry in some dimensions that are widely valued by buyers (Porter, 
1985). Well-chosen emphasis on distinctive organizational features can be very helpful in 
achieving a superior position relative to rival organizations (Porac & Thomas, 1990). 
Being different reduces the amount of competition one faces (Deephouse, 1999), and the 
firm can reap the full advantages of being unique (Porter, 1985). On the reverse side of 
the same coin, an incomplete understanding of how one’s organization differs can be 
detrimental to the success of a differentiation strategy. Firms occasionally base their 
differentiation strategies on criteria that they see as the “real” bases for differentiation, 
but which are not recognized as such by the relevant stakeholders, such as clients (Porter, 
1985). The problem that interferes with strategy formulation is that comparison with 
competitors is one specific case of social comparison processes which regularly occur 
between both groups and individuals. Such comparisons may not be neutral, and humans 
may be systematically biased when they have to establish what is distinctive or unique 
about them. 
 
Systematic bias may arise because what is distinctive about an organization is so closely 
interwoven with how members see the identity of their organization – as an 
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organization’s identity represents what members see as essential, distinctive enduring and 
distinctive about there organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Distinctiveness partly 
explains the missionary zeal often displayed by members of organizations that are new 
and innovative or organizations that pursue unique goals (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). It 
may be that the assumption of being distinctive – not to say unique – is as fundamental as 
assumptions about rationality and internal control (Martin, Feldman, Hatch & Sitkin, 
1983).  
 
Organization members often appear to claim “distinctive” or even “unique” features that 
are not credibly unique as they would like them to be (Martin et al., 1983). They may 
systematically perceive features as “distinctive” whose distinctiveness may not survive 
rigorous comparison. Albert and Whetten (1985: 267) argue that, although the “claimed 
central character” of an organization and its “claimed distinctiveness” are logically 
independent, some empirical overlap may be expected. Could it be that the dimensions of 
differentiation are given by perceptions of the identity of the organization, and that the 
subsequent assessment of the difference on those dimensions with other organizations 
seldom may be as thorough as it theoretically could be? 
 
Jetten, Spears and Postmes (2004: 862) define distinctiveness as “the perceived 
difference or dissimilarity between one’s own group and another group on a relevant 
dimension of comparison”. In an organizational context, this difference can be 
decomposed in member perceptions of their own organization and their perceptions of 
other organizations (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Edwards, 1995; 2001). It would not 
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be surprising if members evaluated their own organization highly on a feature if they 
believed that this feature constituted the essence of their organization. However, 
members may also believe their own organization distinguishes itself from its 
competitors because they believe that competitors achieve lower ratings exactly on those 
features that form the essence of their own organization. This would point to systematic, 
and maybe serious, underestimation of competitors exactly on those features that matter 
most to their own organization, and, by consequence, lead to serious overestimation of 
the degree to which an organization distinguishes itself from the relevant competitors. 
This raises the key question in this study: May we expect a systematic influence of 
degree to which members deem a feature essential for the identity of their own 
organization on their tendency to systematically rate other organizations lower?  
 
Studies in social psychology point to such a bias. Tendencies to see oneself as distinct 
and to underestimate others’ talents appear to be particularly pronounced on dimensions 
that people consider self-relevant (Wood, 1989). For instance, Cross (1977) found, that 
94 % of college professors rated themselves as “above average teachers”. Analogously, 
organization members might have a predilection to select features they deem essential to 
the identity of their own organization as dimensions of comparison and, subsequently, to 
underestimate other organizations’ performance on these dimensions. However, whereas 
social comparison has been investigated quite frequently in small group settings (Jetten et 
al., 2004), at the organizational level they have been scarce so far. 
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May we indeed expect a link between the degree to which organization members 
perceive features to be essential and the degree to which they perceive these same 
features to be distinctive? In order to answer this question, this study first takes a closer 
look at which features members perceive to constitute the essence of their organization. 
Next, it will review literature regarding organization members’ motivation to rate 
competitors different from their own organization, and subsequently review literature on 
how cognitive biases and heuristics affect comparison outcomes. It will investigate the 
relation between perceived essence and distinctiveness empirically and it will discuss the 
implications of the results for research on organizational distinctiveness and identity. 
 
 
The role of features that form the essence of the organization’s identity 
 
When do organization members view a feature of their organization as forming the 
“essence” of the identity of their organization? The key to answering this question may 
be in the “naïve theories” people have about the world surrounding them (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985). Two or more features of a concept (for instance an animal, or an 
organization) cohere if people have a theory explaining why these features cohere. For 
instance, two features of a cat are that it has sharp claws and that it can climb trees. Those 
features cohere: a cat can climb trees because it has sharp claws. The link between the 
two features is not a simple, general association, but a causal explanation of why one 
feature depends upon the other (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Using their theories, people 
explain to themselves and others what their concepts mean, and why things are as they 
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are. The causal relations in which people believe do not need to have a scientific basis: 
what matters are people’s perceptions, not an underlying scientific reality.  
 
This pattern of causal relations among features of an organization provides a key to 
which features constitute its essence. Locke (1991: Book III, Chapter III, p. 217) defines 
essence as follows: “Essence may be taken to be the very being of any thing, whereby it 
is, what it is” (emphasis added). The degree to which people see a feature as constituting 
the essence of an object flows forth from the degree to which they perceive that feature to 
cause its other features (Ahn, 1998). Applying this principle to organizations, we define 
perceived essence as follows: The more a feature is perceived to be the cause of other 
features of an organization, the more that feature is seen as its essence. The great 
advantage of this conceptualization of essence is that it takes into account the human 
inclination to look for causes of features, without assuming any “true” or “objective” 
essence. 
 
 
Empirical evidence for convergence between perceived essential and distinctive features 
 
Can we expect such causal features to coincide with features that are perceived to make 
up the difference with other organizations? Literature provides indications that this might 
be the case. Mummendey and Schreiber (1984) investigated what the members of two 
German left-wing political parties thought of each other. They found that members of 
either party assigned their own party higher ratings on the features that were more 
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important to the identity of the own party. Hewstone, Jaspars and Laljee (1982) found 
that British Comprehensive School boys ascribed their more stereotypic traits 
preferentially to their own group. These traits formed the ingredients for group-serving 
theories on why they differed from Public School boys. In Dutton and Dukerich’s (1991) 
study of the New York Port Authority, the second most frequently mentioned 
organizational feature was: “ethical, scandal-free and altruistic”. Several people 
illustrated this claim by comparing the Port Authority with Grand Central Station, where 
police were moving homeless people “out into the cold” (p. 547). These examples 
suggest some link between what organization members see as essential features of their 
organization and how they see the differences between their own organization and others. 
 
Why more essential features can make a difference 
 
Why might the most essential features – in member perception - be also those features 
where differences with comparison partners are most pronounced?  Literature in social 
psychology suggests two ways in which perceived essence and difference may cohere. 
On the one hand, people may be motivated to compare favorably to others. Dunning 
(1999) argues that the judgments people make of themselves and of others may be self-
serving. For instance, when people form representations of concepts such as “intelligent” 
or “socially skilled”, those representations are colored by their needs and desires to think 
well of themselves. Such motivated cognition may be very useful in helping people to 
satisfy their desire for ‘optimal distinctiveness’ (Brewer, 1991). On the other hand, 
convergence between essential and distinctive features may be the product of cognitive 
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heuristics. These heuristics might constitute a robust and sufficient source of bias in 
social comparative judgments (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). This kind of “cold 
cognition” might produce a similar bias as often attributed to “hot cognition”, and both 
might work in concert. This study will address both kinds of mechanisms in turn. 
 
 
The potential role of motivated cognition 
 
What evidence can we find about human motivation shaping the relation between what is 
essential about an organization and what is distinctive about it? Wood (1989) argues that 
tendencies to see oneself as superior and to underestimate others’ talents are especially 
pronounced on dimensions that are self-relevant. A core tenet of social identity theory is 
that individuals, having defined themselves in terms of a particular social identity, act to 
maintain the positive distinctiveness of the group with which that identity is associated 
(Haslam, Eggins & Reynolds, 2003). Pickett, Bonner and Coleman (2002) argue that 
enhanced differentiation need will result in heightened levels of content-specific 
stereotyping – as illustrated by the British schoolboys studied by Hewstone et al. (1982). 
Members’ own group must perform well within its own dimensions, even when this may 
cause a lower evaluation on a dimension that is also important to the other group 
(Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984). In order to compare favorably, people occasionally 
engage in social creativity strategies, such as redefining the values of characteristic group 
traits, inducing alternative dimensions of intergroup comparison, or alternative 
comparison groups (Ellemers et al, 2003; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). 
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How far does the influence of such creative processes reach? Elsbach and Kramer (1996) 
collected empirical evidence when American business schools reacted to the first 
publishing of their rankings in Business Week. They consistently found that, even when 
organization members displayed a considerable amount of “social creativity”, they relied 
on already existing core dimensions. Completely new dimensions were neither 
“discovered” nor invented. A majority of members’ selective categorizations highlighted 
cherished attributes that were neglected by the rankings. As one of their Stanford 
respondents said (p. 458): “Some of the things that improve rankings are part of what we 
don’t want to change”. Favorable comparisons were important to Elsbach and Kramer’s 
(1996) respondents, but within the constraints of what they considered to be essential 
dimensions of their organization’s identity. They reacted to relative rankings, but their 
focus was on maintaining the credibility of features that were essential to the identity of 
their organization. 
 
Jetten et al. (2004) performed a meta-analysis on studies addressing the effect of 
intergroup distinctiveness on trait evaluations and on money or point allocations. Their 
results showed that high identifiers (but not low identifiers) tended to allocate more 
points or money to their own group, but that trait descriptions were not affected by the 
degree of identification with a group. In other words, Jetten et al. (2004) did not find 
many indications that people distort their views of differences consciously or 
unconsciously in an attempt to differentiate their own group positively from others. We 
are still short of evidence for a direct motivational link between what members perceive 
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to be essential to the identity of their own organization and its distinctiveness. 
Apparently, the motivation to be distinctive is not sufficient for the cognitive creation of 
contrasts with competitors. 
 
Does this imply that human motivation does not affect social comparisons at all? It may 
do, but in an indirect way. Mussweiler (2003) argues that any evaluation – including the 
evaluation of other organizations – refers to a comparison of the evaluated target with a 
pertinent norm or standard. The first step in comparison processes is the selection of a 
standard. The ready availability of information about members’ own organization makes 
it likely to serve as a standard against which other organizations can be compared. Once a 
standard has been selected, members have to determine on which features they base this 
comparison. When their own organization has to be compared with others, members are 
quite likely to use its most essential features. People then obtain specific judgment-
relevant information about their own and the other organization. The best way to obtain 
this specific information is by searching through their stored knowledge. Rather than 
engaging in an exhaustive comparative test of all plausible hypotheses, people often limit 
themselves to the test of a single focal hypothesis. People then either test the possibility 
that the other is similar to, or the possibility that the other organization is different from 
their own organization (Mussweiler, 2003). 
 
Which of these two hypotheses will people prefer to test? In Western societies, similarity 
to others on self-defining dimensions may imply that one is undistinguished or mediocre 
(Wood, 1989). Organization members may strive for a certain degree of distinctiveness 
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(Brewer, 1991). Therefore, when comparing their own organization with others, members 
are more likely to test the hypothesis of difference rather than of similarity, in particular 
when comparable competitors are involved. Dissimilarity testing increases the 
accessibility of instances of how different other organizations are from their own 
organization. Only a few observations of difference on the crucial dimension are likely to 
suffice, as people are likely to accept a small number of observations as a sufficiently 
representative sample to test their hypotheses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Rabin, 
2002). This is where human motivation is most likely to enter: in the decision on which 
hypothesis is going to be tested. 
 
In summary, extant literature on social comparison does not point to a strong biasing 
influence of human motivation to compare favorably. However, human motivation 
determines whether either the hypothesis of being different from others, or the hypothesis 
of being similar to them is going to be tested. In a competitive context, organization 
members will be more likely to test the hypothesis that they are different from their 
competitors. Testing hypotheses of difference makes the knowledge as to how other 
organizations differ more accessible. If the features that matter most for assessing 
differences are those that are most central to the description of their own organization, i.e. 
its most essential features, knowledge about differences on those essential features will 
be rendered easily accessible as soon as members make comparisons with other 
organizations. The cognitive heuristics that people employ, however, may strongly 
influence this process. 
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Cognitive heuristics influencing social comparison outcomes 
 
Chambers and Windschitl (2004) argue that non-motivational factors in themselves can 
constitute a robust and sufficient source of bias in social comparative judgments. They 
suggest a self-reinforcing mechanism by which this bias comes about. Members have 
much more information available about their own organization, as this is the organization 
where they spend a good deal of their daily life and on behalf of which they perform their 
own on-the-job actions. Therefore, their own organization is also likely to be much more 
salient than other organizations, which in turn may strengthen informational biases. This 
difference in salience may further influence comparison outcomes. This section will 
discuss these aspects in turn. 
 
Differences in accessibility of information. Trait and likelihood information about 
members’ own organization may ordinarily be more accessible from memory than 
information about other organizations. Basically, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
availability heuristic applies: people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of 
an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. Here 
comparison of one’s own organization with other organizations is analogous to 
comparison of oneself with other people. Judgments of one’s own organization can be 
made more easily and quickly than judgments about other organizations. When recruiting 
evidence about one’s own organization, the criteria that are most easily brought to mind 
are the particular behaviors that members perform themselves or that they observe in 
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their own organization, the unusual skills that they possess and the routines known from 
their own organization (Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg, 1989). Furthermore, people 
are likely to be more confident about such assessments, which then may weigh more 
heavily when comparisons with other organizations are made (Chambers & Windschitl, 
2004). 
 
Can we expect this difference in accessibility of information about their own organization 
to be stronger for more essential features? This might indeed be the case. Organization 
members have a ready scheme available about what other organizational features are 
caused by essential features, because such features serve to explain why the organization 
is as it is. The more a feature is seen as the cause of other features of the organization, the 
larger the relative disadvantage for other organizations relative to the members’ own 
organization – as exactly the pattern of causal relations in which essential features are 
embedded represent an important part of the “why and how” of that organizational 
feature. Employees are likely to have much less information available regarding how 
these features apply to competitors. The difference in availability of information about 
the most essential features may therefore be larger than the difference in availability of 
information about more peripheral features. By consequence, the more a feature is 
essential to members’ own organization, the larger the disadvantage other organizations 
have to overcome in achieving a similarly high rating on that feature. 
 
Difference in salience between members’ own and other organizations. The difference in 
salience between members’ own and other organizations may further exacerbate the 
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relative disadvantage of other organizations. Even if the information available were equal 
for all organizations, the difference in salience may have an impact on the comparison 
process and its outcome. If two entities differ in salience, evidence recruitment of the 
high-salience entity may begin before evidence recruitment for the low-salience entity. 
This difference in salience might be particularly prominent if members’ own and another 
organization are being compared on a feature essential to their own organization. If 
people were fully exhaustive in their search, this temporary priority of the high-salience 
entity would not matter. However, as people are rather likely to conduct only a truncated 
evidence search (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), the temporal priority given to the search 
for evidence for the high-salience entity will ensure that, on average, respondents retrieve 
more evidence relevant to the high-salience entity than to the low-salience entity. As their 
own organization is likely to be more salient to members, this mechanism may further 
enhance a relatively lower judgment of other organizations, in particular on features 
deemed essential to their own organization. This makes it even more likely that the more 
members see a feature as essential to their own organization, the lower they rate other 
organizations on it.  
 
Joint effects of difference in availability of information and salience of organizations. 
The differences in availability of information and the higher salience of their own 
organization to organization members bring about two further effects, which may impact 
perceptions of distinctiveness. 
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Firstly, Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg (1989) found that, the more traits are 
ambiguous, the more people were likely to provide a favorable comparison of themselves 
relative to their peers. People create idiosyncratic evidence and criteria. They look at the 
specific behaviors they perform related to that trait, and disregard how others may 
instantiate the same trait. This mechanism is very plausibly applied to organizations, too. 
One organization’s way of being “customer-friendly” may be different from how another 
organization makes its “customer-friendliness” effective. Therefore, members of either of 
the two organizations may think they achieve this feature better than the other. Because 
information about “customer-friendliness” is much more readily available and salient  in 
one’s own organization, one’s own way of enacting it is not unlikely to be perceived as 
more “correct” or “effective” and count as the standard. 
 
Secondly, when one’s organization is more salient and information about members’ own 
organization is much more available, another process may occur, which parallels social 
comparisons between individuals: people tend to use their own skills or characteristics as 
an anchor from which they make adjustments when forming a comparative judgment. 
(Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Kruger, 1999). These adjustments are typically 
insufficient, leading to biased results (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Kruger (1999) for 
instance, found that the answer to the question: “How to I compare with peers?” is based 
considerably more on “I” than “my peers”. When interviewing 22 people on 22 abilities, 
and asking for explanations about how they arrived at their estimates of their comparative 
standing, 97 % of the explanations began with reference to the participants own level of 
ability, and 62 % ended there, without any reference to the abilities of others whatsoever 
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(Kruger, 1999). If a feature is perceived as highly essential of their own organization, and 
people do not pay attention to information about other organizations, distinctiveness 
ratings might reflect just that, rather than any information about other organizations. 
 
In summary, the difference in availability of information about members’ own 
organization and other organizations and the difference in salience of their own 
organization versus other organizations make it likely that organization members believe 
that the same features apply to a greater extent to their own organization rather than to 
other organizations. The degree to which a feature is seen as the essence of the 
organization contributes to the availability of information about that specific feature of 
members’ own organization as well as to its salience. Therefore, it likely that if members 
see a feature as forming the essence of their own organization, they may more severely 
underestimate its competitors on that feature. 
 
Central Proposition The more members perceive one  feature to cause the other 
features of their own organization, the lower the rating of other 
organizations on that feature. 
 
Concluding, we can indeed expect a relation between the degree to which organization 
members believe that a feature constitutes the essence of the organization and the degree 
to which members believe that feature to distinguish their own organization from other 
organizations. The motivational antecedent may be people’s tendency to test hypotheses 
of difference rather than of similarity (Mussweiler, 2003). Our review of the theory on 
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social comparison processes, though, suggests that the correspondence between essential 
and distinctive features is mainly due to how humans process information in a context 
where information about their own organization is much more available and salient than 
information about other organizations. Cognitive heuristics seem to lead to systematic 
underrating of comparison partners. The more a feature is perceived to form the essence 
of their organization, the stronger this underrating may be. In the next section, we will 
describe the research project in which we tested this hypothesis. 
 
Methods 
 
The site of the research was a Dutch vegetable seed improvement company. Management 
had commissioned this study in order to prepare possible future positioning, and wanted 
to explore which organizational features might be endorsed by employees. In particular, 
management was interested in knowing what features might constitute the essence of the 
organization. In order to achieve a credible future positioning, they wanted to know 
whether any of the main competitors outperformed the organization on any of the 
features that might be essential. The research was done in two phases: in the first, 
qualitative, phase catchwords were collected to describe the organization. In the second 
phase, data for computing the essence of the respective features were collected, as well as 
ratings of the focal organization and the main competitors on these features. 
 
Qualitative phase: collecting the relevant organizational features 
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In order to make interorganizational comparisons, two kinds of features might be 
relevant: on the one hand, features that applied to the organization at that point in time, 
and, on the other hand, features that may not apply strongly at that particular time, but 
which might be highly desirable. It is perfectly imaginable that organization members 
could make comparisons in terms of such desirable features, where potentially 
competitors might outperform the focal organization. The features were collected by 
means of two versions of a short questionnaire. Half of the respondents wrote down the 
three features that best described their company at that point in time. The other half wrote 
down the three features that their company should ideally have. The second author 
handed out the questionnaires personally to all 325 employees. Later on, she collected the 
forms personally. Exceptions to this procedure were the sales people, who received this 
questionnaire by email.  271 questionnaires were returned (83.4 % response). The 
features were coded by the second author and an independent coder, who was otherwise 
not involved in the research project. The coefficient of agreement (Miles & Huberman, 
1994) was 0.69. After discussion between the two coders, the coefficient of agreement 
amounted to 0.96. Table 1 shows the 7 most frequently mentioned features of both 
currently perceived and desired identity. Overlap is high: desired and currently perceived 
identity shared six out of seven most frequently mentioned features. Together with 
“thorough” (currently perceived identity) and “cares for employees” (desired identity), 
this produced a list of eight very frequently mentioned features. Management desired to 
emphasize two other features, “innovative” (14th feature of currently perceived identity, 
with 13 mentions; 18th place for desired identity, with 8 mentions) and “customer-
oriented” (22nd position of currently perceived identity, with 5 mentions; 12th position in 
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desired identity, with 11 mentions). These were included into the final questionnaire for 
the quantitative phase. In this way, in total ten features served as an input to the 
questionnaire. 
 
Quantitative phase: testing our hypothesis 
The second step of the research project entailed a questionnaire. This section focuses on 
those items in the questionnaire that were relevant for this study: the assessment of the 
degree to which features constituted the essence of the organization, and the ratings of the 
focal company and its seven most prominent competitors. 
 
Following the definition of essence derived above, establishing the perceived essence of 
the organization’s identity required establishing the degree to which members perceived 
each of the ten features to cause each of the other nine. A complete assessment of all 
combinations of features is necessary in order to obtain a reliable comparison of the 
degree of causality of each of the ten features. For this purpose, the questionnaire 
included ten blocks of questions. A different feature headed each of these blocks, and the 
other nine features were suggested as possible causes for that feature. For instance, one 
page was headed by the phrase "our organization is social, because....", and then the other 
nine features were listed. For each feature, respondents could give four possible answers. 
If respondents agreed, they marked "Yes, I agree". If they believed the feature listed 
would be incompatible with the feature heading the page, they could mark: "No, on the 
contrary". If they saw no relation, they could mark: "these two are unrelated to each 
other". The possibility also existed that respondents believed that, in principle, one 
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feature was likely to cause another, but for some reason this did not occur at their 
organization. In this case, respondents could mark: "I agree, but this does not apply to our 
organization". 
 
If respondents marked "I agree" with a suggested causal relation, this was coded and 
processed as a "1". Causal relations which members did not perceive to apply to the 
organization at that time were coded as a zero connection. That is, both "these two 
features are unrelated" and "I agree, but this does not apply to our organization" were 
coded as "0". If respondents marked "no, on the contrary" at a suggested causal relation, 
this was coded as "-1". These ratings served to calculate the total number of other 
features which each feature caused, i.e. its "overall causality". For each feature, these 
numbers were summed across the possible causal relations with each of the nine other 
features. In this way, for each respondent, the total causality was calculated for each 
feature, which represents the degree to which that feature forms the essence of the 
organization for that respondent. 
 
Additionally, a table represented the seven companies which according to management 
were the most relevant competitors and the focal company itself. The rows were preceded 
by a column listing the ten features, and respondents were asked to rate to what degree 
each of the ten features applied to each of the eight organizations (ranging from “1” = 
“does not apply at all” to “7” = fully applies”). In order to avoid bogus answers, 
respondents were asked to mark an X if they had no idea about the degree to which a 
feature applied to a company. 
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The questionnaires were distributed personally by the second author to half of the 
employees of the organization, except for members of the sales force, who received the 
questionnaire by ordinary mail. Of the 164 questionnaires distributed, 133 were returned 
(81.6 % response). There were no significant differences in response rate between the 
eight departments (χ2 = 2.17, df = 7, p= 0.95). In order to double-check for non-response 
error, we recorded the moment the questionnaires returned to the second author. Of all 
respondents, 37 returned the questionnaire by themselves to her. After four days, she 
passed by the employees at their workplace and collected 39 questionnaires. In total 57 
questionnaires were returned after that moment. For the variables described above, 
ANOVA showed no single significant difference at 5 % level between these early, middle 
and late returners, which, in combination with the high response rate, suggests that non-
response bias is unlikely to be a problem. Of all the questionnaires, 119 were sufficiently 
complete to allow further processing. 
 
As for the competitor ratings, we were not so much interested in the rating of each 
specific competitor, but rather in the degree to which the focal organization would be 
distinct from any competitor, regardless of the competitor’s idiosyncratic ratings. 
Therefore, we considered the ratings of the individual competitors as indicators of an 
overall competitor judgment. The lowest row in Table 2 shows that the Cronbach α’s for 
the competitor ratings on each of the ten features were all 0.70 or higher, most of them 
well over 0.80. 
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Analysis and results 
 
Table 2 gives the averages and standard deviations for the ratings of the focal company 
and its competitors, as well as the correlations. We note that members rated their own 
organization higher than their competitors on all ten features. The second last column 
shows that the correlation between the degree to which members perceive a feature to be 
essential to their own organization and the rating organization members accord to 
competitors is negative and significant. The averages in Table 2 are correlated -0.66 (p < 
0.05). However, this correlation between averages may equal out substantial individual-
level variance. Therefore, we computed the average correlation (across respondents) by 
computing the average Fisher Z over all respondents and deriving the corresponding 
correlation from this average Fisher Z score (Rosenthal, 1991, p. 87). The resulting 
correlation was -0.19 (p < 0.001). This is another indication that our principal hypothesis 
might be confirmed. 
 
Although both correlations are negative and significant, the level at which the correlation 
is computed makes a difference. Therefore, we tested our central hypothesis using 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM, Bryk & Raudenbush, 2002). It allows estimating 
average regression coefficients for the whole sample, taking into account the 
heterogeneity between individuals. In total, ten organizational features i are judged by 
organization members j. For testing our central hypothesis, the final regression equation 
for organization member j judging organizational features i will be (Model 2 in Table 3): 
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Average Competitor Ratingij = ß0j + ß1j*Essenceij + rij 
 
The dependent variable is the average rating given to the competitors for feature i by 
respondent j. ß0j is the intercept, which is allowed to vary by individual j. Also, the 
regression coefficient ß1j can vary by individual j. These two parameters can be 
decomposed into an overall average coefficient plus a disturbance term by individual: 
ß0j = γ00 + u0j 
ß1j = γ10 + u1j 
 
These last two equations together represent the higher-level model with the variation 
between respondents. γ00 represents the average intercept of the organization members 
and u0j is the unique difference between the intercept of organization member j and the 
average intercept. γ10 represents the average regression slope, and u1j is the unique 
difference between the slope of organization member j and the average γ10. Both u0j and 
u1j are assumed to be random variables with zero means (Bryk & Raudenbush, 2002). 
The crucial test for the central hypotheses in this paper is whether γ10 differs significantly 
from zero, while being negative. In total, 64 respondents had filled out the competitor 
ratings sufficiently completely to allow for this analysis. 
 
Table 3 builds up the model gradually. It starts with the simplest model, assuming no 
relation between essence and average competitor ratings. Similar to the analysis of 
difference in explained variance in regression analysis when testing differences in R2, the 
improvement of the model when a variable is added is assessed by testing the 
significance of the improvement in fit, reflected by the reduction in deviance. Differences 
in deviance are assumed to have a χ2 distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the 
 24
difference in the number of parameters estimated in the two models (Hox, 2002). Model 
0 in Table 3 represents the baseline model, which reflects the null hypothesis that there is 
no link between perceived essence and perceived distinctiveness and that all variation is 
random. For each individual, at level 1, competitor ratings are regressed on the degree to 
which the respective ten features are perceived to form the essence of the organization. In 
model 0, β0j represents the intercept for respondent j and rij is the individual-level error 
term. The level-2 model decomposes the individuals’ intercepts into an overall average 
intercept, γ00, and the difference between the average intercept and the particular intercept 
for person j u0j. Every further model, in order to be accepted, must represent a significant 
improvement of fit over this baseline model. 
 
Model 1 introduces an average regression coefficient γ10, which is assumed to be equal 
for all respondents. The introduction of this parameter reduces the deviance from 1249 to 
1240, which is significant (∆χ2 = 9, df = 1, p = 0.003; Table 3). Model 2 allows this 
regression coefficient to vary among individuals, introducing the variance parameter u1j. 
Deviance is further reduced from 1240 to 1227 (∆χ2 =  13, df = 2, p = 0.002; Model 2 in 
Table 3). Model 2 is able to explain 11 % of the variance at the level of the individual 
employee (σ2 in Table 3), compared to Model 0. Table 3 shows that the average 
regression coefficient of members’ competitor ratings on essence of their own 
organization is -0.10 (T63 = -3.5, p = 0.001). The average regression coefficient of 
members’ competitor ratings on the degree to which they see that feature as essential to 
their organization is significantly smaller than zero. Our main hypothesis is confirmed: 
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the more a feature forms the essence of the identity of an organization, the lower 
members rate competitors on that feature. 
 
Discussion 
 
This research set out to investigate the relation between what would constitute the 
essence of organizational identity and what distinguishes that organization from others. 
Our literature review suggests that a connection between perceived essence and 
distinctiveness is likely. The confirmation of our main hypothesis shows indeed a 
significant inverse relation between the degree to which a feature is essential to the 
identity of the organization and competitor ratings for these features. The amount of 
variance our HLM model explains at the level of individual organization members is 
11 % (Table 3). This amount of explained variance might have been higher if we had 
asked for “the average competitor”, but we wanted organization members to face real 
competitors, as asking for the “average competitor” may have led  to answers that might 
not have been at all based on consideration of the other organizations (Kruger, 1999). Our 
significant effect was obtained with real comparison partners, in a situation where we 
encouraged respondents to rate competitors only if they had an idea about the 
competitors’ performance on the respective features. 
 
The described mechanism provides an explanation to the “uniqueness paradox” found by 
Martin et al. (1983). The organizational stories Martin et al. (1983) inventoried frequently 
refer to what founders or highly influential CEO’s did in the organization. These stories 
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may be read as documentation of the features that played a role in forming the essence of 
the organization, and this may have led people to believe that their organization was 
highly distinctive, even unique, on dimensions that were not unique at all. We have found 
a mechanism by which organization members perceive their organization to be distinctive 
on features that they believe to form the essence of their organization, while at the same 
time, outside observers and stakeholders may seriously doubt the distinctiveness of the 
features involved. 
 
What further implications do our results have for the further study of organizational 
identity? Our analysis represents a first empirical investigation of the empirical overlap 
Albert and Whetten conjectured between perceptions of essence and distinctiveness. It 
shows that the logical independence between what is essential and what is distinctive 
does not translate into perceptual independence. We have argued how “essence” and 
“distinctiveness” are likely to cohere, and empirically found that in the perception of 
organization members these indeed converge to some degree. Nevertheless, they are not 
the same, as otherwise we would have found a stronger correlation between “essence” 
and “distinctiveness”. Given this evidence, it would be intriguing to include the time 
perspective into further research, and investigate how both are related to Albert and 
Whetten’s (1985) third criterion, the criterion of “temporal continuity”. Given the 
frequent reliance on Albert and Whetten’s (1985) three criteria in organizational identity 
research (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2000), research on the nature and the coherence of 
these three criteria may lead to important advances in research on organizational identity.  
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What diverges from suggestions sometimes found in literature (e.g. Dunning, 1999) is 
that not much motivated or “hot” cognition may be needed to create this effect. We 
argued that the link between perceived essence and distinctiveness may not necessarily be 
the result of “motivated” distortion of information, but rather be the consequence of the 
heuristics humans use when judging other organizations in comparison to their own 
organization. Motivation may interfere indirectly with these heuristics, as organization 
members’ desire for optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991) may induce them to test 
hypotheses of difference rather than of similarity (Mussweiler, 2003). In such cases, 
differences will be found pretty quickly. This can explain why we also may find “better 
than average” effects among completely reasonable people in benign environments. 
 
Of course, this study has its limitations. Firstly, the data have been collected at one 
organization only. It would have been great if we had had access to the competitors at the 
same point in time in order to ask the same questions. Future research should not 
compare the same phenomenon across organizations, but preferably across multiple 
regions in the world. Replication of the results in future is definitely on our research 
agenda. Secondly, the study was done at a point in time where the environment in the 
sector was relatively benign. Competition could be characterized as friendly. There were 
no external threats and there was hardly any press exposure, which is in stark contrast to 
the situations described by for instance Elsbach and Kramer (1996) for the re-ranked 
business schools or the New York Port Authority (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).  
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A third limitation is that we examined the outcome of comparison processes as it 
reflected on competitor ratings, but we did not open the “black box” to study the 
comparison processes while they were occurring. This would be a valuable issue to 
address in future research. Fourthly, this study has represented a cross-sectional study at 
one point in time. We did not follow the development of organizational identity over 
time, and modeled perceived distinctiveness as a consequence of the degree to which a 
feature constituted the essence of the organization. 
 
This fourth limitation poses a particularly interesting challenge for further research. It is 
perfectly imaginable that over a longer period of time perceived essence is also the 
consequence of perceived distinctiveness (Ellemers, de Gilder & Haslam, 2004). In the 
history of an organization, perceptions of distinctiveness may be internalized and 
cultivated that subsequently become essential features. For instance, South-west airlines 
set out as a relatively cheap airline company. It was forced to fly fewer planes than 
originally envisaged, and created its 15-minute turnaround, which made it more efficient 
and cheaper than its competitors. At the moment organization members start to elaborate 
upon what they believe to be distinctive, it becomes more essential, as it is believed to 
cause other features. The 15-minute turnaround became a cornerstone in explaining why 
Southwest Airlines is still cheaper than its competitors, and why its competitors cannot 
even achieve its low level of cost (O’Reilly & Pfeffer, 2000). It might be that, in the short 
term, perceptions of distinctiveness are influenced by what members believe to be the 
essence of their organization. Thus, in the long term, perceptions of distinctiveness may 
bring about perceptions of essence. 
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What does this imply for managers? This study makes clear how organization members 
are prone to interpret  features that describe the essence of the identity of the organization 
somewhat too quickly as features that also distinguish it from others. Our results show 
how members can easily and unwittingly fall into the trap of choosing a “real” basis for 
differentiating their organization which for people less involved in the organization is not 
so real at all. This study underscores how consciousness of this trap and careful attention 
to it can prevent managers from falling time and again into the “uniqueness paradox”, 
claiming features to be unique for their organization while they are widely shared with 
others. Maybe even more importantly, it helps them understand why other organization 
members may favor a positioning that is not so much distinctive but rather relies closely 
upon their perceptions of what makes up the essence of the organization. This study has 
investigated how these biases are likely to arise. With the insight into this mechanism 
provided by this study, managers can make other organization members aware of this 
trap, and redirect the appropriate attention to features that have properly value added for 
external stakeholders. In this way, this study offers the instruments to deal with the 
internal biases that might otherwise prevent the organization from designing an effective 
strategy, while acknowledging how members themselves view their organization. 
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Table 1 Most frequently mentioned key words at the organization 
 
Rank Keyword for 
currently perceived 
identity 
Number of 
mentions 
Keyword for 
desired identity 
Number 
of 
mentions 
1 Social 40 Quality 37 
2 Quality 29 Reliable 35 
3 Reliable 27 Social 30 
4 Pleasant atmosphere 25 Open 28 
5 Amicable 24 Cares for employees 27 
6 Thorough 24 Pleasant atmosphere 24 
7 Open 20 Amicable 23 
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Table 2 Averages for the organizational features and correlations between the averages 
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Number of features 
caused 
 
4,83  
(2,06) 
3,19  
(2,01) 
5,72  
(2,06) 
4,91  
(1,95) 
2,44  
(2,18) 
4,43  
(1,89) 
3,78  
(2,89) 
3,35  
(2,26) 
4,40  
(2,17) 
4,17  
(3,04) -  
Ratings of the focal 
company  
 
6,20  
(0,88) 
6,33  
(0,69) 
6,36  
(0,66) 
6,31  
(0,71) 
5,93  
(1,03) 
6,22  
(0,73) 
6,13  
(0,87) 
6,09  
(0,92) 
6,12  
(0,75) 
5,53  
(1,17) 
0.35 a
0.29*b - 
Average rating of the 
seven competitors 
 
4,04  
(1,32) 
5,43  
(0,79) 
4,87  
(1,26) 
4,53  
(1,34) 
5,36  
(0,86) 
4,57  
(1,19) 
5,17  
(1,13) 
5,43  
(1,09) 
4,67  
(1,34) 
4,14  
(1,28) 
-0,66*a
-0.19*b 
0.24 a
0.19*b 
Cronbach α for the 
seven competitors 
 
0.85 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.70 0.89 0.90 0.94   
The numbers in brackets are the standard deviations 
*  Correlation significant at 5 % level  
a This is the correlation between the averages as shown in this table. 
b This is the average of the individual correlations (computed via Fisher-Z transformations, see Rosenthal, 1991, p. 87) 
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Table 3 Outcomes of HLM-analysis with average competitor ratings as the dependent variable 
MODELS TESTED Parameters  Estimates 
S.E.  Df p Within-
person 
R2  
Devi-
ance 
No of 
para-
meters 
Change 
in χ2  
significance of 
improvement 
Model 0 Coefficient 
  T        
Level 1: features i within persons j: Intercept γ00 4.86 0.14 35.8 63 0.000 - 1249 3 - - 
 Avgcompetitorsij = ß0j + rij            
 
Variance 
  Χ2        
Level 2: between persons j 
Intercept U0 1.06  582 63 0.000      
  ß0j = γ00 + u0j Level-1 var. σ2 0.71          
            
Model 1 
Coefficients   
T 
       
Level 1 : features i within persons j Intercept γ00 4.86 0.14 35.7 63 0.000 4 % 1240 4 9 0.003 
Avgcompetitorsij = ß0j + ß1j*Essenceij + rij    Essence γ10 -0.09 0.03 -3.3 440 0.001      
            
Level 2: between persons j Variances 
  Χ2        
 ß0j = γ00 + u0j+ rij Intercept, U0 1.06  582 63 0.000      
 ß1j = γ10  Level-1 var. σ2 0.68          
            
Model 2 
Coefficients   
T 
       
Level 1 : features i within persons j Intercept γ00 4.85 0.14 35.5 63 0.000 11 % 1227 6 13 0.002 
Avgcompetitorsij = ß0j + ß1j*Essenceij + rij   Essence γ10 -0.10 0.03 -3.5 63 0.001      
            
Level 2: between persons j Variances 
  Χ2        
 ß0j = γ00 + u0j+ rij Intercept, U0 1.09  612 57 0.000      
 ß1j = γ10 + u1j Essence, U1 0.02  86 57 0.000      
 Level-1 var. σ2 0.63          
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